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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Matthew James Gonzales, pied guilty to one 
count of felony injury to a child. He received a unified sentence of ten years, with five 
years fixed. 
On appeal, Mr. Gonzales contends the district court erred in denying his motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea as that plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary. 1 
Mr. Gonzales also contends that his sentence represents an abuse of the district court's 
discretion because, given any view of the facts in this case and in Mr. Gonzales' life, a 
sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, is excessive. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Three year old A.B. fell and suffered a seizure while in Mr. Gonzales' care. 
(Presentencing Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSl),2 p.4.) While A.B.'s mother, 
Mr. Gonzales' girlfriend, had gone to Burger King for food, A.B. walked behind a 
partition. (PSI, p.2.) While she was out of his sight, Mr. Gonzales heard a thud and 
saw that she was having a seizure when he went to check on her. (PSI, pp.2, 4.) When 
A.B.'s mother returned, they took A.B. to the hospital; from there she was flown to a 
children's hospital in Utah. (PSI, p.2.) A.B. had a broken arm, bleeding on her brain 
and brain damage from lack of oxygen. (PSI, p.12.) A.B. has mostly recovered from 
1 By asserting that he relied on any inaccurate statements or misrepresentations of the 
law by his counsel, Mr. Gonzales does not assert any claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel herein, but chooses to reserve any such claim for any future petition for post-
conviction relief, should one be forthcoming. See Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 
806 (1992) (defendant may raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel either on 
direct appeal or through a petition for post-conviction relief, but not both). 
2 The designation "PSI" includes the presentencing investigation report as well as any 
attachments such as letters of support for Mr. Gonzales. 
1 
the incident, but still had a wandering eye at the time of Mr. Gonzales' sentencing. 
(4/23/12 Tr., p.91, Ls.19-22, p.93, L.5.) Although AB. had previously been hospitalized 
for falling out of her playpen onto a concrete floor two weeks earlier, police investigated 
Mr. Gonzales for abuse and charged him with one count of felony injury to a child for the 
injuries AB. sustained while in his care. (PSI, p.3; R., pp.1-2; 4/23/12 Tr., p.51, L.12 -
p.52, L.4.) 
Mr. Gonzales waived his preliminary hearing, and the State filed an information 
charging him with felony injury to a child. (R., pp.65-68, 108-109.) 
On January 10, 2012, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Gonzales pied guilty to 
felony injury to a child as set forth in the Amended Information. (1/10/12 Tr., p.4, Ls.5-9, 
p.9, Ls.5-10; R., pp.108-115, 117-118.) In exchange for Mr. Gonzales' guilty plea, the 
State agreed to recommend a unified sentence of six years, with three years fixed. 
(1/10/12 Tr., p.3, Ls.5-13; R., pp.110-115, 117-119.) The district court accepted the 
plea, ordered a PSI, and set the matter for sentencing. (1/10/12 Tr., p.10, Ls.13-20.) 
On April 23, 2012, the district court sentenced Mr. Gonzales to a sentence of ten 
years unified, with five years fixed. (R., pp.122-126.) A judgment of conviction was filed 
on April 25, 2012. (R., pp.122-126.) Mr. Gonzales filed a notice of appeal on May 31, 
2012. (R., pp.130-133.) 
On June 12, 2012, Mr. Gonzales filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the 
grounds of manifest injustice. (Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, attached to the Motion 
to Augment filed on 3/4/14.) On August 17, 2012, Mr. Gonzales filed an Amended 
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. (Amended Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, attached to 
the Motion to Augment filed on 3/4/14.) On September 12, 2012, Mr. Gonzales filed a 
Second Amended Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, which specifically asserted that 
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Mr. Gonzales' guilty plea was defective because, at the time Mr. Gonzales entered his 
plea, he never admitted to any facts that would implicate criminal liability to support the 
crime of felony injury to a child. (Second Amended Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, 
attached to the Motion to Augment filed on 3/4/14.) In support of his motions, 
Mr. Gonzales submitted numerous affidavits and documents, including his own affidavit, 
in which he set forth his understanding of the nature of the charges against him, based 
on his conversations with counsel. 3 (Affidavit of Matthew Gonzales in Support of 
Motions to Withdraw Guilty Plea, p.6, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on 
3/4/14.) In his affidavit, Mr. Gonzales set forth his understanding of what the State 
would have to prove in order for a jury to find him guilty of felony injury to a child: 
Mr. Peterson also told me that all Mr. Pearson had to prove was that I was 
being inattentive and if I went to trial and I was convicted, he would push 
for a seven and three sentence or something worse. I was worried 
because Mr. Peterson told me that all the State had to prove was that I 
was in the house and therefore I was responsible for the injuries. 
(Affidavit of Matthew Gonzales in Support of Motions to Withdraw Guilty Plea, p.6, 
attached to the Motion to Augment filed on 3/4/14.) According to his affidavit, 
Mr. Gonzales then told Mr. Peterson that he would accept the plea offer. (Affidavit of 
Matthew Gonzales in Support of Motions to Withdraw Guilty Plea, p.6, attached to the 
Motion to Augment filed on 3/4/14.) 
On August 3, 2012, Mr. Gonzales filed a motion for a sentence reduction 
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 ("Rule 35"). (Rule 35 Motion, attached to the Motion 
to Augment filed on 3/4/14.) On June 27, 2013, the district court issued a written 
3 Mr. Gonzales has had several attorneys during the pendency of his case. In his 
affidavit, he refers to discussions with his counsel that he relied on in making his 
decision to plead guilty. According to Mr. Gonzales' affidavit, counsel on whose advice 
he relied was Kevin Peterson. (Affidavit of Matthew Gonzales in Support of Motions to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea, p.6, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on 3/4/14.) 
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decision denying Mr. Gonzales' Rule 35 motion. (Order Denying Rule 35 Motion, 
attached to the Motion to Augment filed on 3/4/14.) Mr. Gonzales then filed a Motion to 
Reconsider Denial of Rule 35 Motion on July 3, 2013. (Motion to Reconsider Denial of 
Rule 35 Motion, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on 3/4/14.) The Motion to 
Reconsider was based on information being developed in conjunction with 
Mr. Gonzales' various motions to withdraw his guilty plea. (Motion to Reconsider Denial 
of Rule 35 Motion, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on 3/4/14.) 
In a written decision filed on November 14, 2013, the district court denied both 
the Motion to Reconsider and the Motions to Withdraw Guilty Plea, finding that manifest 
injustice had not been shown as Mr. Gonzales understood the crime and the 
consequences of pleading guilty and he entered the plea knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligently. (Augmented Clerk's Record on Appeal (hereinafter, ACR), p.18.) The 
district court relied on the definition of the term "willful" contained in I.C. § 18-101. 
(ACR, p.19.) The district court also denied Mr. Gonzales' Motion to Reconsider on the 
basis that it lacked jurisdiction to consider a motion to reconsider its order denying 
leniency under Rule 35. (ACR, pp.14-15.) 
On November 18, 2013, Mr. Gonzales filed an amended notice of appeal. (ACR, 
pp.3-7.) Mr. Gonzales is appealing the denial of his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and 
also asserts that his sentence is excessive given any view of the facts.4 
4 On appeal, Mr. Gonzales does not challenge the denial of his Rule 35 motion, as there 
was no new information presented in conjunction with his Rule 35 motion. (Rule 35 
Motion, attached to the Motion to Augment filed on 3/4/14.) The Idaho Supreme Court 
has held that "[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the 
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to 
the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 
(2007). "An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to 
review the underlying sentence absent the presentation of new information. Id. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Gonzales' Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed upon Mr. Gonzales a 
sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, following his plea of guilty to felony 




The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Gonzales' Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
As Mr. Gonzales' Plea Of Guilty Was Not Knowing, Intelligent And Voluntary 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Gonzales filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing. The 
district court denied Mr. Gonzales' motion. Mr. Gonzales asserts that the district court 
erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, as Mr. Gonzales did not 
understand the elements of the offense at the time of his plea. Because Mr. Gonzales 
pied guilty without understanding the element of the crime, his guilty plea could not have 
been knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under I.C.R. 11. As such, Mr. Gonzales 
established that a manifest injustice would result if he was not allowed to withdraw his 
guilty plea. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Should a guilty plea be found legally defective, relief must be granted. State v. 
Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957 (Ct. App.1990). The United States Supreme Court has held 
that a guilty plea, entered without the defendant understanding all of the elements of the 
crime to which he is pleading guilty, is constitutionally invalid. Bousley v. United States, 
523 U.S. 614, 618-619 (1998). This Court reviews constitutional claims de novo. See, 
e.g., State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 91 (2004). 
C. The General Law Governing Motions To Withdraw Guilty Pleas After Entry Of A 
Judgment Of Conviction 
Motions for withdrawal of pleas are governed by I.C.R. 33(c). After a defendant 
has been sentenced, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea generally will be granted only to 
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correct manifest injustice. Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c); State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 
887 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 361 (Ct. App. 1997). It is the 
defendant's burden to show that a manifest injustice would result if the motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea were denied. State v. Gomez, 124 Idaho 177, 178 (Ct. App. 
1993). 
Manifest injustice will be found if the plea was not taken in compliance with 
constitutional due process standards, which require that a guilty plea be entered 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Huffman, 137 Idaho at 887; State v. Heredia, 
144 Idaho 95, 97 (2007); State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428, 432 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. 
Detweiler, 115 Idaho 443, 446 (Ct. App. 1989); Brooks v. State, 108 Idaho 855, 857 
(Ct. App. 1985), Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). 
The United States Supreme Court has held that a guilty plea, entered without 
the defendant understanding all of the elements of the crime to which he is pleading 
guilty, is constitutionally invalid. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618-619 
(1998). The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized this same basic principle and has 
held that, "Whether a plea is voluntary and understood entails inquiry into three areas: 
(1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he understood the 
nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and 
intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to confront his accusers, and to refrain from 
incriminating himself; and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of 
pleading guilty." State v. Coyier, 98 Idaho 32, 34 (1976) (emphasis added). Thus, it is 
clear that in order to enter a valid guilty plea, the defendant must understand the nature 
of the charge against him, including the elements of the crime charged. 
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D. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Gonzales' Motion To Withdraw His 
Guilty Plea Because His Plea Was Not Knowingly, Intelligently And Voluntarily 
Made 
Mr. Gonzales asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) provides that "[a] motion to withdraw 
a guilty plea may be made only before [the] sentence is imposed or imposition of [the] 
sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may 
set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty 
plea." Id. The timing of the motion to withdraw a guilty plea affects the exercise of the 
trial court's discretion. State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 801 (1988). A motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea filed after sentencing can only be granted to correct a "manifest 
injustice." Id. 'This strict standard is justified to insure that an accused is not 
encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of the potential punishment and withdraw 
the plea if the sentence is unexpectedly severe." State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 68, 72, 14 
P.3d 388, 392 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Mr. Gonzales contends that he provided the district court with the reasons 
constituting manifest injustice for the withdrawal of his guilty plea and he should have 
been allowed to withdraw his plea. 
1. Mr. Gonzales' Guilty Plea Was Constitutionally Invalid Because 
Mr. Gonzales Pied Guilty Without Understanding The Nature Of The 
Crime 
To the extent to which Mr. Gonzales pied guilty to felony injury to a child, without 
understanding that this crime requires the defendant to place the child in a potentially 
harmful situation with knowledge of the danger, his plea of guilty was not knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily entered. The United States Supreme Court has held that a 
guilty plea, entered without the defendant understanding all of the elements of the crime 
8 
to which he is pleading guilty, is constitutionally invalid. Bousley v. United States, 523 
U.S. 614, 618-619 (1998). The test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is 
"whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative 
courses of action open to the defendant." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized this same basic principle and has held 
that, "Whether a plea is voluntary and understood entails inquiry into three areas: 
(1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he understood the 
nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and 
intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to confront his accusers, and to refrain from 
incriminating himself; and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of 
pleading guilty." State v. Coyier, 98 Idaho 32, 34 (1976) (emphasis added). 
A voluntary guilty plea thus requires that the defendant understand the nature of 
the charges to which he is pleading guilty. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 n.7 
(1969); State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 222 (2008). Therefore, it is clear that in order to 
enter a valid guilty plea, the defendant must understand the nature of the charge 
against him, including the elements of the crime charged. 
In Idaho, the district court is not generally obligated to inquire into the factual 
basis of a guilty plea; however, such an inquiry should be made if the court has 
information which raises an obvious doubt as to whether the defendant is in fact guilty. 
Amerson v. State, 119 Idaho 994, 996 (Ct. App. 1991). The goal behind ascertaining a 
factual basis is to assure that the defendant's plea is made knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily. Id. 
The change of plea hearing transcript demonstrates that the Mr. Gonzales did 
not understand the nature of the charge against him: 
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Q: In the Information, it says - and this is the Amended Information that 
was filed today. It says that, "Matthew James Gonzales, in the County of 
Bannock, State of Idaho, on or about the 21st day of January, 2011, did 
having the care or custody of a minor child, AB., cause or permit said 
child to be injured or placed in such situation that the child's person or 
health was in danger." Are you admitting to those facts? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: You have the right, Mr. Gonzales, if you wish, to tell me what 
happened that day. Do you want to? 
A: I'll just pretty much just make it the situation. I'm not pleading guilty to 
hurting her, but, I guess, I mean, I should have kept a closer eye on her, 
you know, been more diligent. 
Q: Are you admitting that during the time she was in your care or custody 
that she was injured? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: All right. And that she was placed in a situation where her health or 
person was endangered? 
A: Yes, sir. 
(1/10/12 Tr., p.8, L.21 - p.9, L.22.) 
Idaho Code§ 18-1501 (1) and (5) provide5: 
(1) Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce 
great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, 
or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having 
the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or 
health of such child to be injured, or willfully causes or permits such child 
to be placed in such situation that its person or health is endangered, is 
punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one (1) year, 
or in the state prison for not less than one (1) year nor more than ten (10) 
years. 
5 In 2005, I.C. § 18-1501 was amended to include a definition of "willfully" specific to 18-
1501. 
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(5) As used in this section, "willfully" means acting or failing to act where a 
reasonable person would know the act or failure to act is likely to result in 
injury or harm or is likely to endanger the person, health, safety or well-
being of the child. 
I.C. § 18-1501(1) and (5). Thus the statute contains the correct definition of "willfully" 
and the district court's reliance on I.C. § 18-101 was erroneous. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has noted that "[a] plain reading of section 18-1501 (1) 
indicates that its purpose is to punish conduct or inaction that intentionally causes a 
child to suffer." State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 373 (2002) (holding that use of the 
definition of "willfully" taken from I.C. § 18-101 6 erroneously misled the jury about the 
mental element of the offense of injury to a child and required that the defendant be 
given a new trial). The Court went on to state, "[t]he purpose of the statute is not to 
punish mistakes in judgment that are reviewed in hindsight. ... [o]therwise custodians 
of children may be subjected to criminal penalties for good faith decisions that turn out 
poorly-innocent mistakes in judgment." Young, 138 Idaho at 373. 
Thus, the willfulness element of I.C. § 18-1501 requires that the person providing 
care or custody of the child willfully endanger the child by subjecting the child to a 
known risk of harm. State v. Morales, 146 Idaho 264, 267 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. 
Halbesleben, 139 Idaho 165, 170 (Ct. App. 2003). This does not require that the 
6 The jury instructions in Young included an instruction taken from I.C. § 18-101, which 
defined the word "willfully" as follows: 
The word "willfully," when applied to the intent with which an act is done or 
omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act or make 
the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate the law, or 
to injure another, or to acquire any advantage. 
Young, 138 Idaho at 373. 
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defendant intended to harm the child, but it does require that the defendant placed the 
child in a potentially harmful situation with knowledge of the danger. Id. 
In Halbesleben, the parents of a malnourished 10 year old child were charged 
with felony injury to a child for willfully causing or permitting a child to be placed in such 
situation that its person or health was endangered. Id. The jury was instructed that an 
act was done willfully when done on purpose and that one could act willfully without 
intending to violate the law, to injure another, or to acquire any advantage. Id. at 169. 
In interpreting the endangerment clause of I.C. § 18-1501(1), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals observed that "[t]he 'willfulness' element of the endangerment offense applies 
not merely to the act of placing the child in a particular situation but also to the 
endangerment." Id. 139 Idaho at 170. The Court observed that "[t]he instructions [given 
in that case] allowed the Halbeslebens, like the defendant in Young, to be convicted 
even if they made a good faith mistake." Id. The Halbesleben Court recognized that 
the Young Court was focusing on a clause within I.C. § 18-1501(1) other than the 
endangerment provision under which the Halbeslebens were prosecuted.7 However, the 
Halbesleben Court still found the holding in Young to be instructive and held: 
The "willfulness" element of the endangerment offense applies not merely 
to the act of placing a child in a particular situation but also to the 
endangerment. That is, the offense occurs only if the custodian willfully 
endangers the child by subjecting the child to a known risk of harm. Unlike 
the clause at issue in Young, this does not require that the defendant 
intended to harm the child, but it does require that the defendant placed 
the child in a potentially harmful situation with knowledge of the danger. If 
the endangerment clause of § 18-1501 (1) were interpreted as not 
requiring awareness of the danger or hazard, it would criminalize "good 
7 In Young, the clause at issue was "willfully causes or permits any child to suffer," while 
in Halbesleben, the defendants were prosecuted under the clause prohibiting conduct 
that "willfully causes or permits [a] child to be placed in such situation that its person or 
health is endangered." Id. 
12 
faith decisions that turn out poorly," an interpretation rejected by the 
Supreme Court in Young. 
Halbesleben, 139 Idaho 170. Thus, the Halbesleben Court found that the jury 
instruction on the definition of "willfully" misstated the law and allowed a defendant to be 
prosecuted for errors in judgment. Id. According to the Court, under the endangerment 
clause "the offense occurs only if the custodian willfully endangers the child by 
subjecting the child to a known risk of harm." Id. The Halbesleben Court went even 
further, and held that when a defendant is prosecuted under the endangerment clause, 
an additional instruction on mens rea, beyond merely quoting the statute, is required to 
ensure that the jury understands the scope of the mental element because: 
Id. 
Otherwise, the phrase "willfully causes or permits such child to be placed 
in such situation that its person or health is endangered" might be 
interpreted by the jury as proscribing the act of willfully placing a child in a 
situation that was apparently safe, but that ultimately endangered the 
child. Such a misinterpretation would relieve the State of the burden to 
prove that the defendants willfully subjected the child to danger. 
Therefore, the Halbesleben Court vacated the conviction and remanded the case 
for a new trial holding that "when a defendant is tried for a violation of the endangerment 
clause of I.C. § 18-1501(1), the jury should be instructed that the State's burden 
includes a burden to prove that the defendant knew that the situation into which the 
child was placed would endanger the person or health of the child." Id. 139 at 224. 
In Morales, the Idaho Court of Appeals again held that the "willfulness" element 
does not require that the defendant intended to harm the child, but it does require that 
the defendant placed the child in a potentially harmful situation with knowledge of the 
danger. Id. 146 Idaho at 267. Thus, the State would have been required to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Gonzales "placed the child in a harmful situation 
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with knowledge of the danger." See id. However, the knowledge element was not 
established in any stage of the proceedings. 
The element of willfulness was never established, and in fact the nature of 
Mr. Gonzales' discussion of the facts underlying the crime, combined with the 
statements in his affidavit in support of the motions to withdraw, demonstrate that he 
pied guilty based on his understanding that by merely being present in the house where 
AB. was injured he could be found guilty of injury to child. 8 
Because Mr. Gonzales set forth facts which omitted a necessary element of the 
crime, and the district court perpetuated this error by finding that the factual basis for the 
satisfied the statute, Mr. Gonzales did not understand the nature of the crime for 
which he was charged. Thus, Mr. Gonzales pied guilty with the understanding that he 
could be found guilty of the crime even when his only error was in being in the same 
house as the child when the child was injured; therefore, his plea was not knowing, 
intelligent and voluntary. 
2. The District Court Erred In Finding That Mr. Gonzales' Admission Satisfied 
The Willfulness Requirement 
In ruling on Mr. Gonzales' Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, the district court relied 
on the definition of "willfully" contained in I.C. § 18-101, and found that Mr. Gonzales' 
admission satisfied the mens rea required under the statute, specifically, that 
Mr. Gonzales acted "willfully." (ACR, p.19.) This was error. 
8 The statements by Mr. Gonzales both at sentencing and to the presentencing 
investigator are consistent with those made at his guilty plea hearing in that 
Mr. Gonzales consistently maintains that he did not hurt AB., but believes that he is 
responsible for the injury because he was not watching her closely enough. (PSI, p.4; 
4/23/12 Tr., p.96, L.3 - p.99, L.22.) 
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The Idaho Supreme Court, in State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370 (2002), expressly 
rejected the use of this definition of "willfully" in conjunction with a felony injury to child 
charge. Id. at 373 (holding that use of the term "willfully" as defined in I.C. § 18-101 was 
reversible error and remanded the case for a new trial). Thus, in denying Mr. Gonzales' 
motions to withdraw his guilty plea, the district court erroneously relied on language 
from I. C. § 18-101 which provides, in pertinent part, that willingness "does not require 
any intent to violate law, or to injure another." (ACR, p.19.) Such is not the correct 
standard under Idaho law and the district court's decision should be reversed. 
3. The District Court Erred In Failing To Find Manifest Injustice Where 
Mr. Gonzales Relied On The Erroneous Advice Of Counsel At The Plea 
Stage 
Mr. Gonzales relied on the advice of counsel in deciding to plead guilty; however, 
his counsel incorrectly informed him that he could be found guilty just for being inside 
the house at the time AB. was injured. Counsel's advice was clearly incorrect as Idaho 
law and plain language of the statute (as discussed herein in subsections 1 and 2) 
provide that a necessary element of the felony injury to a child statute is that the 
defendant have placed the child in a potentially harmful situation with knowledge of the 
danger. See Ha/besleben, 139 Idaho at 170 (emphasis added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has found that the erroneous advice of counsel at the 
plea stage on a critical element may serve to invalidate the plea of guilty. See Booth v. 
State, 151 Idaho 612 (2011) (holding that counsel's incorrect interpretation of 
sentencing statute during the plea process constituted deficient performance such that 
plea was invalid). Further, when a defendant enters a plea upon the advice of counsel, 
the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice was reasonably 
competent. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 60 (2004). That is, a guilty plea is only valid 
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where the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative 
course of action open to the defendant. Id. 
In his affidavit, Mr. Gonzales set forth his understanding of what the State would 
have to prove in order for a jury to find him guilty of felony injury to a child: 
Mr. Peterson also told me that all Mr. Pearson had to prove was that I was 
being inattentive and if I went to trial and I was convicted, he would push 
for a seven and three sentence or something worse. I was worried 
because Mr. Peterson told me that all the State had to prove was that I 
was in the house and therefore I was responsible for the injuries. 
(Affidavit of Matthew Gonzales in Support of Motions to Withdraw Guilty Plea, p.6, 
attached to the Motion to Augment filed on 3/4/14.) According to his affidavit, 
Mr. Gonzales then told Mr. Peterson that he would accept the plea offer. (Affidavit of 
Matthew Gonzales in Support of Motions to Withdraw Guilty Plea, p.6, attached to the 
Motion to Augment filed on 3/4/14.) 
Thus, defense counsel erroneously advised Mr. Gonzales that he could be 
convicted of felony injury to a child simply by being present in the house when AB. 
sustained her injury, and Mr. Gonzales pied guilty based on that misunderstanding of 
the nature of the charge, i.e., the elements necessary to establish a violation of 
I.C. § 18-1501(1). Mr. Gonzales asserts that, based on his counsel's representations, 
he did not understand a necessary element in that this crime requires the defendant 
place the child in a potentially harmful situation with knowledge of the danger. 
It is clear from the transcript of the change of plea hearing that there was no 
discussion regarding whether Mr. Gonzales knew of a danger to AB. (See generally, 
1/10/12 Tr.) Moreover, the district court then affirmatively told Mr. Gonzales that it was 
the court's opinion that what Mr. Gonzales told it was enough for him to be found guilty 
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under the statute, thereby perpetuating Mr. Gonzales' misunderstanding of the nature of 
the crime of felony injury to a child. 9 (1/10/12 Tr., p.10, Ls.5-7.) 
The change of plea hearing transcript demonstrates that there was no discussion 
regarding the requisite element that Mr. Gonzales must have had knowledge of the 
existence of a dangerous situation or condition in the house. (See generally 1/10/12 
Tr.) Moreover, Mr. Gonzales' admission that he was pleading guilty because AB. was 
injured while he was watching her, coupled with his understanding (based on counsel's 
advice) that the State only had to prove that he was in the house when the injury 
occurred in order for a jury to find him guilty, evidencing his lack of understanding of the 
elements of the offense. Such was insufficient to comply with the due process standard 
of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent plea. 
A guilty plea based upon misunderstanding of the elements necessary to 
establish a violation of I.C. § 18-1501(1) was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 
Mr. Gonzales relied on the incorrect representation of his counsel. As a result, 
Mr. Gonzales' plea of guilty was legally defective. The district court should have found 
a manifest injustice would have resulted should Mr. Gonzales's guilty plea stand, as 
Mr. Gonzales had entered a guilty plea without understanding the elements of the 
crime. The district court erred in denying Mr. Gonzales' Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. 
9 After obtaining a factual basis for the plea from Mr. Gonzales, the district court told 
him, "Mr. Gonzales, it is my opinion that what you have told me is enough for you to be 
found guilty under the statute." (1/10/12 Tr., p.10, Ls.5-7.) 
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11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Upon Mr. Gonzales A 
Sentence Of Ten Years, With Five Years Fixed, Following His Plea Of Guilty To One 
Count Of Felony Injury To A Child 
Mr. Gonzales asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of ten 
years, with five years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Gonzales does not allege that 
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, Mr. Gonzales must show that in light of the governing criteria, the 
sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or 
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
In light of the mitigating factors present in this case, Mr. Gonzales' sentence is 
excessive. 
One important fact that should have received the attention of the district court is 
that Mr. Gonzales has strong support from his family members. See State v. Shideler, 
103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who had the support of 
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his family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts); see also State v. Carrasco, 114 
Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), overruled on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295 (1990) 
(reducing sentence of first-time offender who had a family depending upon him for 
support and who accepted responsibility for the offense at issue). 
Mr. Gonzales has a very supportive family. Mr. Gonzales' mother and father are 
very supportive of Mr. Gonzales and wrote letters to the court on his behalf. (PSI, pp.7-
8; April 4, 2012, Letter from Virginia Gonzales, attached to the PSI; March 13, 2012, 
Letter from the Gonzales family, attached to the PSI.) Mr. Gonzales also has the 
support of his aunt, who wrote a letter on his behalf in which she extolled Mr. Gonzales' 
dedication to his children and his family. (Letter from Socorra Williams, attached to the 
PSI.) Mr. Gonzales also has the support of community members. Bradley Huerta wrote 
a letter to the court on Mr. Gonzales' behalf, noting that Mr. Gonzales is a decent and 
caring father who loves his children and the community. (Letter from Bradley Huerta, 
attached to the PSI.) Mr. Huerta, who volunteered as an assistant coach for city-wide 
athletics alongside Mr. Gonzales, also noted that he would trust his own children to the 
care of Mr. Gonzales. (Id.) Further, Mr. Gonzales has two children, boys ages 13 and 
5, whom he loves and misses very much and one of his goals is to spend more time 
with them. (PSI, p.9.) 
Mr. Gonzales has maintained fairly consistent employment, despite his periods of 
incarceration. Mr. Gonzales has job skills as a laborer and concrete finisher and 
worked for Guerrero Brothers Concrete for two years. (PSI, p.10.) Further, 
Mr. Gonzales has employment waiting for him upon his release from incarceration. 
(PSI, p.1 O; Letter from Joe Guerrero, owner of Guerrero Brothers Concrete, attached to 
the PSI.) Idaho recognizes that good employment history should be considered a 
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mitigating factor. See State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982); see also State v. 
Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). 
Most notably, Mr. Gonzales expressed remorse for his conduct and took 
responsibility for his acts. (PSI, p.4; 1/10/12 Tr., p.4, Ls.5-9; 4/23/12 Tr., p.96, L.3 -
p.99, L.22.) Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant 
expresses remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. State v. 
Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 
1991). Mr. Gonzales expressed his remorse and sadness numerous times over what 
had happened to A.B. 10 (PSI, p.4.) 
Mr. Gonzales told the presentencing investigator that he was responsible for 
letting A.B. go into the other room. (PSI, p.4.) At sentencing, Mr. Gonzales further 
apologized for what happened, saying "I didn't watch her close enough. And that's 
something that I'll have to live with the rest of my life." (4/23/12 Tr., p.98, L.25 - p.99, 
L.2.) See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982) (reducing sentence of first time 
offender who accepted responsibility for his acts and had the support of his family in his 
rehabilitation efforts); see also State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 
1988), reversed on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295 (1990) (reducing sentence of first time 
offender who accepted responsibility, expressed remorse, and had been of good 
character before the offense at issue); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 
1991) (noting that some leniency is required when the defendant has expressed 
"remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept 
treatment and other positive attributes of his character"). 
10 Mr. Gonzales wrote, "I think about it everyday all 400 + days and probably forever. 
just wish I would have followed her." (PSI, p.4.) 
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Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Gonzales asserts that the district 
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him, failing to take 
into consideration his family support, employability, and remorse. Had it taken these 
factors into consideration, it would have imposed a less severe sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Gonzales respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remand for further proceedings. 
Alternatively he requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate or 
remand the case back to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 4th day of March, 2014. 
SALi! J. COOLEY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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